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The Presidentialization of the Romanian 
Political System
An Interplay between Structures and Contingencies
ALINA STURZU
The phenomenon of presidentialization has been mainly presented as a para-
doxical movement of parliamentary systems towards a political modus operandi spe-
cific to their competing model, presidentialism1. Within this field of discussion, the 
cases that would qualify for an in-depth analysis would be the Western states, most 
often exponents of parliamentarism with minor variations. A restriction to the area of 
research would prove detrimental to the aspirations to enrich the nature of the argu-
ment. The impetus that Marina Costa Lobo brings through her statement describing 
presidentialization ”as a trend in several advanced industrial democracies, regardless 
of their constitutional framework”2 serves as a point of departure for the questions 
that set in motion this analysis: Is presidentialization conquering also the ”new democra-
cies” in Central and Eastern Europe? All the more, can an Eastern-type of presidentialization 
be demarcated? If so, does it follow in the footsteps of its Western counterpart?
Before delving into the actual analysis, the conceptual clarifications should be 
addressed in the light of the latest theoretical considerations. The leadership-oriented 
style of politics, denounced as a shift towards presidentialism without proper imple-
mentation, has been portrayed as a consequence of both structural factors (e.g. the 
internationalization of politics, the growth of the state, the progress of mass commu-
nication and the alteration of traditional social cleavage politics) and contingent fac-
tors (e.g. the political context and the leader’s personality)3. One of the central sets of 
studies regarding the shift towards leaders concentrated on the personalization of poli-
1 See, for instance, Thomas POGUNTKE, ”The Presidentialization of Parliamentary 
Democracies: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Paper prepared for presentation at the ECPR 
Workshop ”The Presidentialization of Parliamentary Democracies?”, Copenhagen, April 
2000; Richard HEFFERNAN, ”Presidentialization in the United Kingdom. Prime Ministerial 
Power and Parliamentary Democracy”, Paper prepared for delivery at the 28th Joint Sessions of 
workshops of the European Consortium of Political Research, University of Copenhagen, 14-19 
April 2000; Dan KORN, ”The Presidentialization of Politics: The Power and Constraints of the 
Israeli Prime Minister”, Article 2, The Joseph and Alma Gildenhorn Institute for Israel Studies, 
University of Maryland, available at http://www.israelstudies.umd.edu/research-papers.
html. Last accessed on 15.05.2011.
2 Marina Costa LOBO, ”The Presidentialization of Portuguese Democracy?”, in Thomas 
POGUNTKE, Paul WEBB (eds.), The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern 
Democracies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, pp. 269-288/p. 269.
3 Thomas POGUNTKE, Paul WEBB (eds.), The Presidentialization of Politics…cit., 
pp. 13-17.
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tics1 viewed as triggered by a larger process of individualization2 of the social life. Lauri 
Karvonen, for instance, enumerates several characteristics of this trend: (a) the insti-
tutional framework places individual politicians above groups or parties, (b) politics 
is presented in a manner which emphasizes the leaders, (c) the citizens comprehend 
politics more as a competition between individuals, (d) the electorate tends to form its 
preferences and allocate their votes on the basis of the evaluation of the candidates, 
thus deciding the outcome of elections, (e) the power relationships begin to be settled 
considering the individual traits of politicians3. The personalized way of conducting 
politics is incontestable, but it should be integrated into a larger phenomenon that 
depicts not only the increased visibility of political leaders, but also their capacity to 
aggregate resources and make claims of autonomy in areas such as policy-making.
In this context, the concept of ”presidentialization” seems to best capture the con-
temporary transformations within most of the democratic societies. In a study enti-
tled Media and the Presidentialization of Parliamentary Elections (2000), Anthony Mughan 
holds that the concept implies a 
”movement over time away from collective to personalized government, 
movement away from a pattern of governmental and electoral politics dominated 
by the political party towards one where the party leader becomes a more 
autonomous political force”4.
It could thus be argued that, irrespective of the constitutional arrangements, the 
leader assumes a quasi-monarchical standing, making the political world go round 
according to his personal perspectives, values and beliefs. Whether it eventually entails 
constitutional modifications or derives from a ”transient political circumstance”5, the 
presidentialization of politics is perceived as a phenomenon with impacts upon the 
quality of democracy, thus its evaluation could draw inferences about the future of 
the democratic regimes.
Applying this theoretical framework to Central and Eastern Europe is no unpro-
blematic task, considering the specificity of the paths followed by the countries belon-
ging to the ex-communist block. To catch a glimpse of this puzzle, the debate would 
be directed towards much limited and much familiar grounds. Therefore, the analysis 
integrates into the ”presidentialization” debate, a new comer, Romania, as a country 
that underwent a painstaking democratization process after the fall of communism in 
1989, on its road to European integration and democratic consolidation. The theoreti-
cal approach adopted follows the structure proposed by Thomas Poguntke and Paul 
Webb, in their edited volume entitled The Presidentialization of Politics: A comparative 
Study of Modern Democracies. As such, the test of presidentialization would be com-
1 Lauri KARVONEN, ”The Personalization of Politics. What does research tell us so far, 
and what further research is in order?”, Paper prepared for the 4th ECPR Conference, Pisa 6-8 
September 2007, available at http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/generalconference/pisa/
papers/PP226.pdf. Last accessed on 6.05.2011. 
2 Zygmunt BAUMAN, The Individualized Society, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 1-17.
3 Lauri KARVONEN, ”The Personalization of Politics…cit.”, pp. 3-4.
4 Anthony MUGHAN, Media and the Presidentialization of Parliamentary Elections, Palgrave, 
New York, 2000, p. 7.
5 Ibidem, p. 8.
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pleted after a thorough examination of three dimensions vital to the complexity of the 
argument: (a) leadership power resources; (b) leadership autonomy and (c) persona-
lization of the electoral process1. To this purpose, it is imperative to delve into three 
corresponding spheres of power: executive, party and electoral process. Not only are 
these investigations instrumental in detecting an incipient or a matured presidentia-
lized system, but they also shed light upon its evolution across the post-1990 period. 
Going from the structural aspects towards interconnected contingent factors, the 
present assessment holds that despite anticipated differences, there are points of con-
vergence between the Western and Eastern types of politics. The genuine prominence 
of leaders is to be derived from the evaluation of the nature of leadership powers in 
three most important political postures: as head of the executive, as party leader and, 
last but not least, as candidate in elections. All things considered, the present research 
does not only seek for confirmation of the existence of a presidentialising trend in 
Romania, for an isolation of a particular presidentialization in an European context, if 
at all possible, but also for a better understanding of the Romanian political system.
The Executive Face
One significant mark of presidentialization resides in an enhanced executive 
branch. The traditional separation of powers instituted an interdependent relati-
onship between the executive and the legislative, adding various mechanisms that 
maintain the equilibrium between the components of the system. Whether it is a sin-
gle executive (presidential systems) or a dual executive, with a mostly ceremonial 
head of state and a more powerful head of government (parliamentary or hybrid 
regimes), this branch is the locus where ”effective power over policy”2 is exerted. As 
a consequence, a larger amount of resources and influence at the discretion of the 
head of government, be it a president or a prime minister, provides him or her with 
the possibility to take personal decisions regarding appointments or policy choices. 
At this stage of the analysis, the primary objective is to examine how the lifespan of 
the executives progressed in Romania starting with the 1990s and to what extent the 
informal structures of power have been developed in conformity with the logic of 
intra-executive presidentialization. 
The 1991 Constitution in Romania has not explicitly guaranteed the separation 
of powers. The option was justified, during the debates on the final form of the fun-
damental law, by the uniqueness specific to the sovereignty of the people, a strict 
divide between the three powers being analogous to a ”scientific error”3. From this 
initial flaw, a series of ambiguities and institutional tensions intensified throughout 
the post-communist period. 
First of all, considering the president-premier relations, the nature of the Roma-
nian political system is still an enigma. Influenced by the institutional design of the 
1 Thomas POGUNTKE, Paul WEBB (eds.), The Presidentialization of Politics…cit., p. 5.
2 Gabriel ALMOND, G.B. POWELL JR., Kaare STRØM, Russell DALTON (eds.), 
Comparative Politics Today, Eight Ed., Pearson, Longman, New York, San Francisco, Boston, 
2004, p. 116.
3 Victor DUCULESCU, Georgeta DUCULESCU, Revizuirea Constitutiei – Istoric. Drept 
Comparat. Documente. Opinii, Editura Lumina Lex, Bucureşti, 2002, p. 99.
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French Fifth Republic and constrained by the memory of communist dictatorship, the 
balance of power between the two offices is not clearly tipped in favour of one side or 
another. Romania has usually been viewed as a semi-parliamentary republic due to a 
mixture between two core features of presidentialism and parliamentarism, as emp-
hasized by Duverger: the direct election of the president, as the head of the state, and 
the accountability of the government in front of the Parliament1. Some authors have 
deemed this system as premier-presidential2, drawing attention to the perils of coha-
bitation, which needed two ”rules” to be respected: primarily, a set of clear provisions 
for an effective separation between the presidential and prime ministerial responsi-
bilities, and secondly, a compliance with the division of powers on both sides, for the 
prevention of competitive diarchy. Nonetheless, different studies placed Romania in 
a number of typologies3, though Thomas Baylis openly admitted the difficulties expe-
rienced by country experts when deciding upon the exact type of executive predomi-
nant in this case:
Table 1
Typologies of the Form of Government in Romania
Stepan and 
Skach (1993)
Derbyshire and 
Derbyshire
(1996)
Baylis
(1997)
Easter (1997) Elgie (1998) Berlund 
(2001)
Romania Presidential Limited 
presidentialism
Presidential Presidential Semi-
presidential
Parlia-
mentary
Actually, Giovanni Sartori goes so far as to place the Romanian system within the 
parliamentary category, tough certain presidential tendencies are to be detected due 
to the fact that the prerogatives of the president, most of the time dependent on the 
approval of the legislative, place him on the same position as head of the Parliament4. 
Moreover, in an empirical study put forward by Andre Krouwel, the level of presi-
dentialism is -2.0 (presidential score 2.5, parliamentary score 4.5), indicating strong 
parliamentary features5.
Secondly, the vagueness in terms of who exerts what sort of powers has affected 
the interactions between the Parliament and the executive, between the president and 
the prime minister, and ultimately between the president and the Parliament. To start 
1 Maurice DUVERGER, ”A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government”, 
European Journal of Political Research, vol. 8, no. 2, June 1980, pp. 165-187/p. 166.
2 Mathew S. SHUGART, John CAREY, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and 
Electoral Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 55-56.
3 Table adapted after the data in Andre KROUWEL, ”The Presidentialization of East-
Central European countries”, Paper prepared for presentation at the ECPR Joint Sessions 
Workshop on the Presidentialization of Parliamentary democracies, Copenhagen, Denmark, 
April 14-19, 2000, p. 3; Sten BERGLUND, Frank AAREBROT, H. VOGT, G. KARASIMEONOV, 
(eds.), Challenges to Democracy: Eastern Europe Ten Years after the Collapse of Communism, Edward 
Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2001, p. 17.
4 Giovanni SARTORI, ”Alcuni chiarimenti sul semipresidenzialismo”, Studia Politica. 
Romanian Political Science Review, vol. III, no. 3, 2003, pp. 617-620/p. 618.
5 Andre KROUWEL, ”Measuring Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: An Application 
to Central and East European Countries”, Acta politica, vol. 38, 2003, pp. 333-364/p. 350.
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with the legislative branch and the positioning of the executive in relation to it, it is 
essential to draw attention to the weakness of the Romanian Parliament. In its bica-
meral structure, with the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies having similar prero-
gatives, the Parliament was often perceived as exaggeratedly large, highly corrupt, 
inefficient and somehow ”the source of all evils”. In practice, as Cristian Preda was 
underscoring, 
”there is a gap between the de iure enforcement of the Parliament as central 
element of the Romanian regime and its atrophy in the attempt to manage the 
political conflicts of the society”1.
In fact, the post-communist settlements have informally established the execu-
tive as the main legislative initiator. The Parliament’s right to issue legislation has 
been, throughout these decades, surpassed by a provision granting the government 
the possibility to adopt emergency ordinances through a mechanism known as legis-
lative delegation (Article 114.4). These ordinances are either approved automatically, 
if the Parliament does not sit in a session, or after twenty days, if the first notified 
chamber does not approve it. The ”exceptional” nature of these acts has gradually 
transformed into a routine justified either through the urgency to reform the state or 
comply with the European legislation. 
Table 2
Emergency Ordinances (1991-2008)
Government Emergency Ordinances
Theodor Stolojan
(Oct. 1991-Nov. 1992)
1
Nicolae Văcăroiu
(Dec. 1992-Nov. 1996)
16
Victor Ciorbea
(Dec. 1996-Apr. 1998)
104
Radu Vasile
(Apr. 1998-Dec. 1999)
260
Mugur Isărescu
(Dec.1999-Dec. 2000)
296
Adrian Năstase
(Dec. 2000-Dec. 2004)
692
Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu
(Dec. 2004-Dec. 2008)
730
TOTAL 2099
Source: Table adapted after Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimul, partidele şi sistemul 
politic…cit., p. 40 and the website of the Chamber of Deputies, www.cdep.ro. 
1 Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimul, partidele şi sistemul politic din România, Editura 
Nemira, Bucureşti, 2008, p. 36. 
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A closer scan of the constitutional text1 reveals a president who, in the light of 
the communist experience, is deprived of real powers of action and whose popular 
legitimacy seems to be restricted to a mere representation of the state under accura-
tely defined circumstances. Described as a politically neutral, the presidency excludes 
any type of membership in a political party or activities attached to such a status. It is 
only by this manner that an objective president would successfully mediate between 
different institutions should conflicts occur. The relations president-legislative pre-
sent another limitation, since the head of the state can dissolve the Parliament only in 
the exceptional case in which two proposals for the prime minister have been rejected, 
and only after previously consulting the presidents of the two chambers and the lea-
ders of the parliamentary groups (Article 89). In what regards the government, he is 
entitled to choose his closest political partner, the prime minister, but once again, con-
sultations should be held beforehand with the party that obtained the absolute majo-
rity or, otherwise, with all the parties represented in the legislature (Article 102.1.). 
Once again the presidential proposal can be rejected when a vote of no confidence is 
granted. Furthermore, the president can issue decrees, certain areas, such as foreign 
policy, impose the countersignature of the prime minister. In terms of legislation, he 
has to promulgate the laws passed in the Parliament, with the possibility to return 
them, once only, for revision (Article 77). In case of misconduct, there are two ways 
to sanction the president: (a) suspension from office for ”grave acts” initiated by one 
third of the total number of MPs, approved by absolute majority (Article 95) and con-
firmed or dismissed through referendum; (b) impeachment for ”high treason” is deci-
ded by two thirds of the number of deputies and senators. 
The prime minister, as the other half of the executive branch, does not enjoy a 
type of legitimacy comparable to that of the president, his appointment being depen-
dent on the leadership position within the party that had won the parliamentary elec-
tions and on the personal preference of the president. On most occasions, the elected 
presidents were the leaders of the party which had won the elections, whereas the 
prime-ministers were either high profile politicians within the governing party or the 
leaders of another party within the winning coalition. Subsequently, the appointment 
was either a matter of trust and political compatibility or the response to an obligation 
to grant recognition to the coalition partners and preserve the parliamentary majo-
rity. The powers of the prime minister, as regulated specifically by Article 106 of the 
Constitution, place him as the head of the government and consist of coordinating the 
activities of the cabinet. Additionally, he has to submit reports and declarations regar-
ding the workings of the government to the Chamber of Deputies or to the Senate, 
for further debates. 
Such stipulations have led to a particularly high conflict potential within the 
bicephalous executive. The governmental instability characteristic of the first demo-
cratic decade confirms the importance ascribed to a consensual collaboration between 
the president and the prime minister. The majority of the prime ministers who have 
prematurely ended their mandate have openly expressed their opposition to the pre-
sident regarding the direction of policies and reforms. Though, in formal terms, the 
1 The Constitution of Romania, The Official Journal of Romania, Part I, no. 233 of 21 
November 1991, (as revised by Law No. 429/2003 on the revision of the Constitution of 
Romania), available at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/act_show?ida=1&idl=1&tit=1#t1c0s0a1. 
Last accessed on 10.05.2011.
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president cannot dismiss the head of the government, his informal ties with the party 
in government, most often his former party, create the opportunity to remove the 
premier through parliamentary intervention (motion of censure). Comparing the two 
offices, the presidency has again much to gain from prerogatives such as that of appo-
inting and revoking ministers of the cabinet, which despite requiring the proposal 
of the latter, it is known to be a matter of bargaining and compromise. In the end, a 
lower cabinet duration was the norm in the first years of democratization, a situation 
determined by the difficulties posed by the communist legacies and the hardships of 
transition. 
A supplementary source of dispute is also related to the often invoked popular 
legitimacy that makes the president the representative of the people, and thus the 
spokesman of their discontent. A case in point would be that of the cabinet headed by 
Petre Roman, victim of the conflicts with President Ion Iliescu, who sympathized with 
the majority of the population and openly criticized the government he had appro-
ved of. However, an exception to this ”rule” occurred during Traian Băsescu’s first 
mandate (2004-2009), when despite his blatant disapproval of the Tăriceanu govern-
ment, the strong opposition in the Parliament prevented the replacement of the prime 
minister. The political tension reached the peak in 2007, when the president’s too 
active stance caused his suspension, followed by a reconfirmation in office through 
referendum. Though Margit Tavits nominates as primary causes the president’s ”use 
of delay tactics in appointing government officials and his foreign policy statements”1, 
some other factors, such as the divergent political perspectives of the two members 
of the executive or the inter-party clashes (the party supporting the president vs. the 
party supporting the prime minister), should not be overlooked. 
The degree of involvement of the president in policy-making has varied throug-
hout the time intervals under scrutiny. A brief and concise summary of this observa-
tion is offered by Blondel et. al. in a comparative study entitled Governing New Euro-
pean Democracies:
”During his first term, Iliescu was unquestionably directly involved in 
policy-making. His successor, the conservative Constantinescu, seemed to be 
more than occasionally overtaken by events and the presidency lost significant 
prestige in the process. The role of the president seemed to decline further 
when Iliescu returned to power in 2000, as he no longer desired to be markedly 
involved, perhaps because of his age. In 2004, however, with the election of 
Băsescu, the idea of a ’semi-presidential’ Romanian president has come to be 
once more in the news”2.
The degree of presidential leadership had definitely been constrained by parti-
cular political contexts. The immediate years following the collapse of communism 
were practically dominated by the socialists, whereas the demands of democratiza-
tion required a coherent vision and direction, and President Iliescu was perceived as 
the right politician to provide it. Comparing this period with the following one, the 
1 Margit TAVITS, Presidents with Prime Ministers: Do Direct Elections Matter?, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2009, p. 5.
2 Jean BLONDEL, Ferdinand MÜLLER-ROMMEL, Darina MALOVA (eds.), Governing 
New European Democracies, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2006, p. 98.
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benefits of single-party government are undeniable, since the fragmentation and the 
inter-party conflicts kept Constantinescu’s voice at a minimum, considering also his 
non-political background. 
A pertinent observation of the incumbents of the two offices outlines that the 
personality of the president plays a major role in his domination or subordination. 
Basically, the most active and powerful presidents are held to have been Ion Iliescu 
and Traian Băsescu. Their political success, as well as the lower performance of Emil 
Constantinescu, was contingent upon the degree of party personalization and sup-
port, and on the charismatic bond with the electorate. Ion Iliescu was the uncontes-
ted leader of the National Salvation Front, a personality whose participation in the 
1989 events and the breakdown of the communist regime was crucial. Constructing 
himself an image of the ”saviour” of the nation1, the former PCR member has been 
considered the most influential politician of post-communist Romania, being elected 
president of the republic in 1990, in 1992 and in 2000. The chaotic landscape of the 
1990s created the perfect political context for his rise. The informal structures inheri-
ted from the non-democratic epoch and the immediate FSN colonization of all core 
sectors of the society prevented the appearance of major contenders of power. In fact, 
it was only in 1996 that a large coalition, the Democratic Convention (CDR) compri-
sing the major historical parties (the National Liberal Party – PNL, the National Pea-
sant Christian Democrat Party – PNŢCD etc.), managed to defeat the socialist party 
and his leader. In 2000, after a period characterized by economic difficulties, govern-
ment instability and the government’s incapacity to effectively reform the state, Ion 
Iliescu was re-elected. 
The period between 1996 and 2004 can be regarded as a parliamentarization of 
Romania, as outlined above, to a presidential retreat to a rather symbolic role. If Con-
stantinescu was a technocrat placed as the candidate of a large coalition in which two 
parties, PNL and PNŢCD, constantly competed for higher control, in Iliescu’s case, 
since a fourth mandate was fairly impossible, he strategically decided to coordinate 
the activity of the government in the prime minister’s shadow. Undoubtedly, this 
assumption should be kept in mind since the prime minister at that time was Adrian 
Năstase, the leader of the Party of Social Democracy (PSD), and the future candi-
date for presidency in the 2004 elections. Basically, he was given the chance to gather 
enough political capital to continue the Socialist domination. Even so, Daniel Barbu 
makes several thought-provoking remarks regarding these changes in the light of the 
2003 constitutional revision:
”The 2003 revision was necessary in the light of Ion Iliescu’s exit. As in 
the England of the XVIIIth century, the division between Court (presidency) and 
Country (the real country represented in the Parliament) was abolished in the 
favour of the latter: the government in Parliament is ready to completely take 
over the functions of the court, namely the control of the army, of the secret 
services, of the magistracy and bureaucracy”2.
1 Magda M. GIURCANU, ”Institutional Dynamics in Poland and Romania”, Paper 
prepared for the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting in Chicago, Illinois, 
April 3-6, 2008, p. 23.
2 Daniel BARBU, Republica absentă, 2nd ed., Editura Nemira, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 275.
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The highest presidential claim for actual power has characterized the period star-
ting with 2004 onwards. In his electoral campaign, Traian Băsescu, the current presi-
dent, had recurrently referred to a refreshed type of presidential institution, promi-
sing to support a more accurate interpretation of Article 801 of the Constitution and 
be actively involved in policy-making. This approach collided with the constitutional 
provisions, with the prime minister’s political projects and with the position of the 
parliamentary majority. Once again, the paradox, as Ioan Stanomir argues, lied preci-
sely in the now notorious tension between the popular credentials acquired through 
direct elections and these constitutional limitations2, which significantly reduce the 
real powers of the president. On this background, the president had to face his power-
less position against a large coalition between the prime minister and an enhanced 
parliamentary majority. The fact that his suspension, as a result of pressures to hold 
early elections and force the PM to resign, was removed through the negative vote of 
the population in the referendum marks, as Cristian Preda argues, an annulment of 
the parliamentarization of the regime3. 
In such conditions, a proper presidentialization would position either the pre-
sident or the prime minister on a clear position of superior power. Until the head of 
the government becomes the main political prize and succeeds in acquiring a status 
similar to parliamentary republic, the presidency continues to be perceived as the 
leading office. 
The Party Face
Nowadays, the widespread belief is that parties do no longer fulfill their main 
functions to attract members and mobilize voters. The party machineries have some-
how lost their individuality being fascinated with a ”successful model” that gains 
elections without such intensive efforts: a charismatic candidate. Undoubtedly, 
though the ideological dimension of parties appears as an obsolete artifact in a poli-
tical environment infused with catch-all and populist parties, it would be erroneous 
to overlook the importance of the party that recruits, trains, promotes and assigns in 
top positions politicians with remarkable careers. To provide a better assessment of 
the Romanian party system, the question to be answered is whether leadership posi-
tions have been enhanced to the point that the presidentialization of politics becomes 
inescapable. 
To start with, this comparison centered on parties brings to the fore a number of 
evident differences regarding the past and present party systems, the party families 
and their historical development, the ideologies and programmes, the issues that 
divide and unite different parties. It is again the dichotomy East-West that would 
place the Romanian party system in a different cluster. Irrespective of the party poli-
1 The Constitution of Romania, Title III, Chapter II, Article 80 (2), 1991 (as revised in 2003), 
available at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?den=act1_2&par1=3#t3c2. Last accessed 
on 10.05.2011. The article stipulates that the President of Romania ”shall act as a mediator 
between the Powers of the State, as well as between the State and society.”
2 Ioan STANOMIR, În jurul Constituţiei: practica politică şi arhitectura legală, Editura 
Universităţii din Bucureşti, Bucureşti, 2006, pp. 150-151.
3 Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimul, partidele şi sistemul politic…cit, p. 35.
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tics, the main intention, at this point, is that of focusing on the intra-party life and on 
the distribution of power that might be to the leader’s advantage. Consequently, the 
nature of personalized party would provide extremely helpful in the present analysis. 
The marks of presidentialization specific to the party area consist of a highly auto-
nomous leader which would exert a growing influence on party appointments and 
policy orientations, consolidate his personalized leadership and aggregate the neces-
sary resources to maintain this status.
Throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the lack of a pluralist tradition as pre-
vented by the communist regime and a slow political learning of the democratic ways 
affected the new parties in terms of delayed institutionalization, low ideological cohe-
rence, populism, office-seeking and leadership-orientation. Romania was no excep-
tion, its party system being shaped by a more and more restraining legislation, a 
high unpredictability and instability. One of the first flaws specific to the democratic 
beginnings was the absence of limitations on party formation, the total lack of electo-
ral thresholds (in 1990) or low percentages (3-5% for parties, 8-10% for alliances), and 
a PR system based on party lists, which facilitated the ad hoc emergence of parties. 
Consequently, the total number of political actors engaged in the electoral race, from 
1990 to 2008, came around 196, alliances included. In discussing the peculiarities of 
the Romanian post-communism, Cristian Preda refers to a number of ”non-political 
parties” (e.g. the Orphans and War Prisoners Party, the Free Democrat Party or the 
Romanian Christian Democrat Conservative Party), which are born out of immatu-
rity, demagogy, the intention to obtain financial gains or out of pure self-delusion1. 
Later on, the legislation introduced in 1996 and 2003 eliminated these deficiencies. 
From the onset, the parties preferred a large membership basis, such as the Com-
munist Party had sought, including not only experts, businessmen, sponsors or ex-
nomenklatura members, but also persons willing to go at lengths for the electoral suc-
cess of the party. Most of the main parties that survived the electoral volatility have 
been in a continuous competition to attract influential members that could have stren-
gthened their credibility, provide substantial ”donations”, or even become successful 
candidates in the parliamentary or presidential elections. The main attraction for the 
outsiders was not the ideological creed, but rather the opened doors and the career 
possibilities that the parties provided. In fact, until present days, ideologies were 
not the criterion to differentiate between the political players: though they defined 
themselves as either right-wing, left-wing or centrists, the parties included in their 
programmatic appeals mixtures of policies irrespective of their liberal or socialist 
colour. Though recently, they struggled to join international party families, especi-
ally visible at the level of the European Parliament, their ideological discourse is still 
difficult to classify2. Other characteristics of the Romanian parties are linked to their 
dependence on the state and the high levels of political patronage. To this point, the 
development of partitocracy comes as no surprise, since no one raised doubts about 
the well-entrenched clientelistic networks of the parties, the preferential appointment 
from key state positions to local institutions or the widespread nepotism. Within this 
environment, the primary task is to examine the status of the leader in the main par-
ties that have governed in the given time frame. 
1 Cristian PREDA, Partide şi alegeri în România postcomunistă: 1989-2004, Editura Nemira, 
Bucureşti, 2005, pp. 15-18.
2 Laurenţiu ŞTEFAN, Patterns of Political Elite Recruitment in Post-Communist Romania, 
Editura Ziua, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 99.
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In the Romanian case, one can detect a dominance of the party leaders stren-
gthened by their mandates as presidents of the republic. It is the latter office that 
placed influential politicians such as Ion Iliescu or Traian Băsescu not only as strong 
leaders, but as mobilizers of the electorate, which tend to propagate ”close to the ordi-
nary citizen” strategies. Indeed, there were other contingent factors that encouraged 
leadership primacy. To take the example of the main socialist party, under its multi-
ple formulas (FSN, FDSN, PDSR or PSD), we can nominate: (a) Iliescu’s popularity 
during the ”revolution” as the main voice of democratic change, reinforced by his 
charismatic leadership style, appealing particularly to the rural electorate; (b) the 
political chaos after December 1989 and the need of a transitory body to govern until 
elections; (c) the presidential mandates, an office that implied prestige and a privile-
ged place in the front row of politics; (d) the rapid colonization of the state, including 
the control of the privatization process which enriched certain ”businessmen” close 
to the party in power, ensuring future sponsorship; (e) the absence of a strong leader 
of the opposition, namely of the historical parties. 
Later on, the rise of Democrat Party (Partidul Democrat – PD) was perceived again 
as a consequence of Băsescu’s personal appeal and his strategic choices: (a) the deci-
sion to enter the alliance with the liberals in 2004; (b) the decision to merge with the 
PLD (Partidul Liberal Democrat – the Liberal Democrat Party), a faction detached from 
National Liberal Party (Partidul Naţional Liberal – PNL) after the conflicts between the 
president and prime minister Tăriceanu), and reposition as the main centre-right party, 
occupying the void left by the Democratic Convention, (c) the intense exploitation of 
the damaged image of the PDS, accused of corruption, of supporting ”local barons” 
and committing electoral frauds1. Commenting on his leadership style, Renate Weber, 
Băsescu’s former presidential adviser back in 2004, argued that he endeavored to run 
the party and the country based on his experience as ship captain, showing intole-
rance towards opposition and a tight control of everything2.
The manner in which presidentialization works in the Western system is nur-
tured in the Eastern space as well, most often through aggregation of resources as a 
result of clientelism and patronage. The parties’ struggle to attract prosperous spon-
sors, co-opt as many ”party deserters” as possible in order to control the instituti-
ons at the local level and appoint sympathizers in top positions was instrumental 
in huge mobilization of resources during the electoral campaigns (e.g. the financial 
resources were allocated to organize local events, distribute ”electoral gifts” and even 
bring voters in buses to ensure their participation after alleged bribery). In this way 
the party leaders usually surrounded themselves with prosperous and obedient fol-
lowers. Rarely have local leaders, which did not join the leadership core in Bucharest 
and were not ”approved” by Iliescu, gained a particular high visibility at the national 
level. Another mark of autonomy was blatant in the selection of the executive teams 
since the individuals occupying these positions were known to be close to the presi-
dent and sharing his political views. But this was not a prerequisite for uncontested 
leadership. Nonetheless, those who attempted internal coup d’états were finally for-
ced to leave the party or return to their humble status. The first option was chosen by 
1 Edward MAXFIELD, ”A New Right for a New Europe? Basescu, the Democrats & 
Romania’s centre-right”, SEI Working Paper No 106, Sussex European Institute, September 
2008, available at www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/sei-working-paper-no-106.pdf. Last 
accessed on 15.05.2011.
2 Ibidem, p. 27.
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Petre Roman in the 90s, who decided to end the conflict with Iliescu by forming his 
own party, whereas Adrian Năstase, the former PSD prime minister, opted for a more 
diplomatic path in order to become the candidate for presidency in the 2004 elections. 
The personalization of the Romanian parties was not a model of ”authoritarian rule”, 
but open contestation with the purpose of sudden leadership change turned out to be 
generally impossible and not without repercussions.
Actually, the lack of a strong leader holding the presidency caused the fall of the 
Romanian Democratic Convention (Convenţia Democrată Română – CDR1) in the after-
math of its 1996 electoral victory. Severely eroded by its multicolored nature (it com-
prised the historical parties, minority parties, various associations and civic organiza-
tions), its changing composition or the rivalry between PNL and the National Peasant 
Christian Democratic Party (Partidul Naţional Ţărănesc Creştin Democrat – PNŢCD), the 
lack of a unifying leader that would keep under control party ambitions would have 
been crucial. Emil Constantinescu, as an outsider, an intellectual and a former univer-
sity professor, did not possess the sufficient strength to bring together the parties in 
the Convention and make them function as a unitary bloc. Additionally, he failed to 
rise to the people’s expectations, his term being marked by a high number of cabinets 
and ministerial reshuffle, low economic performance, failures in introducing state 
reforms, and criticisms regarding the decision to support the NATO intervention in 
Kosovo.
Furthermore, the strength of leadership went beyond constitutional arrange-
ments, since most of the Romanian president, who where obliged to sever all par-
tisan ties, still indirectly supported their former party. In the case of the PDL, the 
political commentators held that the president still directed the party’s every move. 
In a guide designed for the 2008 elections, the liberals attacked the assertive role of 
Băsescu within PDL described as 
”a party without ideology. It is a party without doctrine, values, which listens 
to one single person. It is a party without a past and a party that will disappear 
along its leader”2.
Without a doubt, Băsescu’s autonomy and influence within his own party has 
outdone his few critics, the party recognizing him as the winning card for their survi-
val at the Victoria Palace. In the same manner, Iliescu had guided his party and even 
today, as honorific president of PSD, his opinions are acknowledged. 
In a nutshell, the intra-party presidentialization within the Romanian political 
arena is oriented both towards party management and policy making3. The increa-
singly leader-centered political arena has instantly facilitated the formation of 
”personal parties”4 (e.g. George Becali’s New Generation Party – Partidul Noua Gene-
raţie) or personalized parties (e.g. PDSR/PSD, PD/PDL), as parties which totally or 
1 For more insight into the CDR rise to power and governance, see Dan PAVEL, Iulia 
HUIU, ”Nu putem reuşi decât împreună”. O istorie analitică a Convenţiei Democratice, 1989-2000, 
Polirom, Iaşi, 2003.
2 Alina VĂTĂMAN, ”Ghid de bune practici pentru campania electorală”, Evenimentul 
Zilei, May 5th, 2008, available at http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/ghid-de-bune-practici-
pentru-campania-electorala-802385.html. Last accessed on 18.05.2011.
3 Thomas POGUNTKE, Paul WEBB (eds.), The Presidentialization of Politics…cit., p. 337.
4 Mauro CALISE, Il Partito Personale. I due corpi del leader, Editori Laterza, Bari, 2010.
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partially rely on their leader in order to access state power. The use of expressions 
such as ”Iliescu’s party” or ”Băsescu’s party” was not uncommon in the Romanian 
political spectrum. In the spirit of a partitocrazia senza partiti (particracy without par-
ties), which basically means exactly the fact that the collegial, organizational and ide-
ological apparatus of the parties operating in the pre-1992 period has been substituted 
with a personal apparatus1, the informal fusion between party leadership and presi-
dential mandates creates the basis of a new presidentialization. This practice is stren-
gthened by the exertion of high influence on internal party elections, the new leaders 
being usually ”accepted” by the presidents and possibly appointed prime ministers, 
which endows the head of the state with a particularly significant share of authority 
within the parties as well.
The Electoral Face
The electoral process represents the most important test for a party and its party 
leader, confirming or refuting the ability to attract the electorate and to respond to 
their demands in an effective manner. Therefore, the link between presidentialization 
and the electoral process is confirmed by the fact that it is the electoral success that 
could considerably strengthen a leader’s position or, on the contrary, cause his irre-
mediable fall. In line with the theoretical framework reproduced from the study of 
Poguntke and Webb, the operationalization of presidentialization in electoral terms 
would entail three interconnected aspects characteristic of electoral campaigns: (1) 
increased importance shown to leadership appeals, (2) the mediatic exploitation of 
the leader and (3) the leader effects on voting behaviour2.
The decline of political parties and erosion of partisanship, the loss in importance 
of the traditional cleavages, the rise of new issues generate a crisis that continues to 
severely affect voting turnouts. The theme of ”electoral dealignment”, as connected to 
partisan dealignment, has become popular within the field of electoral studies, being 
depicted through ”electoral volatility, split-ticket voting, and late decision-making in 
electoral campaigns”3. But what really shapes the final decision of the voter? Is it his 
political attitudes, his party preferences or the candidate factor? If they decide rather 
late on whom to vote and if different types of elections reflect different choices, does 
this mean that the candidates, as individuals, could make a difference? This section is 
aimed at analyzing the three electoral components mentioned above in order to eva-
luate the strategies of the parties, on the one hand, and the responses of the electorate, 
on the other. Additionally, references to the electoral reform as a shift from propor-
tional representation towards a majoritarian type of voting should arouse interest 
regarding the impacts of these changes on the voters’ decision-making process and 
on the electoral results. 
The specificity of the Romanian PR system involved closed lists and a two-tier 
system (district level and national level) for parliamentary elections, a majoritarian 
1 Ibidem, p. 15.
2 Thomas POGUNTKE, Paul WEBB (eds.), The Presidentialization of Politics…cit., p. 10.
3 Romain LACHAT, A Heterogeneous Electorate: Political Sophistication, Predisposition 
Strength, and the Voting Decision Process, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Zürich, 2007, p. 204.
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two-round ballot for the president, as well as guaranteed seats for ethnic minorities1. 
As in the case of party legislation, the Romanian electoral laws have also evolved 
from extremely inclusive to more and more constraining. Consequently, the electoral 
law was amended before every parliamentary election, especially in terms of thres-
holds. In fact, Cristian Preda enumerates among features such as an initial decrease in 
the electoral body (1990-1992), followed by a steady increase, the declining electoral 
turnouts, the effective number of parties (the evolution from ”one party and a half”, 
to multiparty without a dominant party in 1992 and 1996, multiparty with a dominant 
party in 2000 and again multiparty without a dominant party in 2004), also this legis-
lative instability2. However, the issue of a substantive electoral reform was debated 
starting with the 1999s, the majoritarian alternative becoming more tantalizing with 
the passing of years. 
In reality, it was the long-debated electoral reform in March 2008 that placed 
the candidates at the core of the electoral process. The new law established the for-
mation of 43 constituencies (41 counties, Bucharest and diaspora) and introduced a 
mixed system with single-member districts. The citizens grant a four-year mandate 
to their representative for each chamber and the votes are allocated in three stages: 
(a) the candidates with 50%+1 share of votes enter directly in the legislative; (b) the 
total number of votes for a party in a constituency are divided by the electoral coe-
fficient ( ratio between the total votes in the constituency and the number of seats for 
that constituency); after the subtraction of the seats won directly by a party, the rest of 
the mandates are distributed to the candidates with the largest share of votes; (c) the 
remaining mandates are redistributed among the candidates with the highest share. 
In line with Sarah Birch’s argument that ”the option of voting for an individual 
candidate is clearly a device that will personalize the electoral process”3, this so-called 
”uninominal vote” definitely favours primarily the large parties, and secondly puts 
more emphasis on candidates rather than ideologies, since the voting is no longer a 
matter of party lists. This is not to downgrade the importance of leader promotion 
under the PR system: a widespread strategy to attract voters was to place the leader as 
the first candidate on the list, followed by a number of other well-known politicians 
of the party. Even so, one important impact of the hasty introduction of these voting 
procedures that were insufficiently explained to the electorate, the late delimitation 
of the districts, as well as the restrained voting participation (e.g. the citizens could 
vote only in the place of residence, the ones living abroad could vote only if they were 
officially registered in the respective countries) was the an extremely low turnout 
(39.2%). Nonetheless, according to the BTI 2010-Romania Country Report, the future 
might bring an alteration to this tendency to personalize parties and elections:
”The separation of presidential and parliamentary elections as of 2004 (by 
prolonging the president’s term of office to five years) and, more importantly, 
the revision of the electoral laws have increased incentives to create broadly 
1 Jean- Benoit PILET, Jean-Michel DE WAELE, ”Electoral Reforms in Romania: Towards a 
Majoritarian Electoral System?”, European Electoral Studies, Institute for Comparative Political 
Research, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 63-79/p. 66.
2 Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimul, partidele şi sistemul politic…cit, pp. 87-94.
3 Sarah BIRCH, Electoral Systems and Political Transformation in Post-Communist Europe, 
Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2003, p. 22.
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based parties rather than political parties dependent on a single or only a few 
political leaders”1.
The personalization of elections is fostered especially by the race for presidency, 
which we already depicted as a fierce competition between all party leaders eager to 
accede to the Cotroceni Palace. One primary reason for this privileged status of the 
presidential elections was the president’s power to nominate the prime minister and 
the cabinet. Actually, behind closed doors, the head of the state mastered both the 
parliamentary majorities and the composition of the government2. With more details, 
Cristian Preda describes the rationale behind the dependence of governmental and 
parliamentary formulas on the candidates for the presidential elections and on inter-
party dynamics: 
”Two are the reasons of this dependence and they are, in fact, of very different 
natures: first of all, it is the already-mentioned simultaneous organization of the 
legislative and presidential elections, which dominated the first five elections; 
secondly, it is the important role played by few political leaders in identifying 
the political strategies and tactics of the parties”3.
The fact that the candidates’ efforts were directed towards the success of their 
parties, at the first stage of legislative elections, and that, in turn, the parties aggre-
gated all possible resources in order to have their candidate win the ”big prize” is 
undeniable. Even so, the five year mandate ascribed to the president was not only 
desirable for a continuity of the political life without major disturbances, but also for 
a detachment of the parliamentary elections and party platforms from the ”presiden-
tial contamination”4.
Under these circumstances, the personalization of electoral campaigns became 
the key strategy of the Romanian parties. To keep in mind the considerations tra-
ced beforehand, it is expected of low institutionalized and poorly ideologically defi-
ned parties that presented quite similar programmes and discourses to seek a charis-
matic leader that would mobilize the apathetic electorate. More than that, the high 
importance of leaders is further demonstrate by the fact that, with the exception of 
Emil Constantinescu in 1996, the other two post-communist presidents obtained a 
larger share of votes that their supporting coalitions. Even before the parliamentary 
elections, the presidential race was the main subject of debate, manifested through a 
trade of accusations and personal attacks between the candidates. Negative campaig-
ning was another common practice among parties with the purpose of convincing the 
electorate that their candidate was ”the lesser evil”. The most striking examples are 
the corruption evidences brought by the Justice and Truth Alliance (Alianţa Dreptate 
1 Bertelsmann Stiftung, ”BTI 2010 – Romania Country Report”, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
Gütersloh, 2009, p. 10, available at http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/
fileadmin/pdf/Gutachten_BTI2010/ECSE/Romania.pdf. Last accessed on 20.05.2011.
2 Bogdan DIMA, ”Preşedintele României: instituţia cheie a sistemului constituţional 
românesc”, Sfera Politicii, vol. XVIII, no. 1 (143), January 2010, pp. 30-41/p. 37.
3 Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimul, partidele şi sistemul politic…cit, p. 127.
4 Bogdan DIMA, ”Preşedintele României…cit.”, p. 37.
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şi Adevăr – D.A.) against PSD and Adrian Năstase, or PSD’s exploitation of a contro-
versial video in which Băsescu allegedly hit a child during his 2004 campaign1.
The symbiotic relationship between political parties and the state resulted in the 
intense exploitation of state resources and state-owned media. The FSN employed 
this practice since the first free elections. For the new party it was essential to stay in 
power, consolidate its position and organizational structures and mature while bene-
fitting from the windows of opportunity provided by the transition. The general per-
ception was that each party that governed immediately subordinated a large part of 
the state resources and most of the media, especially the state television. It was only in 
2004, when Băsescu, through his aggressive anti-communist discourse, the appeal to 
go and vote in order to prevent another fraudulent victory for the PSD and his inno-
vative electoral campaign, managed to win against Năstase in the second round, that 
the press was clearly split between those who supported the socialist and those who 
promoted change. For instance, it was obvious that newspapers such as Cotidianul 
or Ziua were pro-Băsescu. Both public and private media should have avoided paid 
political advertisements and provide equal coverage for all candidates, which was 
not always the case. Generally speaking, the public television is a major supporter of 
whoever holds the power.
Inevitably, the development and ”americanization” of the media augmented the 
promotion of the leader through its various channels of communication. The use of 
posters, billboards and banners featuring the candidates and mobilizing messages 
has also been a method through which the party positioned their leader in the front 
row. Electoral programs including interviews with the candidates and monitoring the 
development of the campaigns throughout the country provided the electorate with 
substantial information on the leaders and their promises. More than that, televised 
face-to-face debates grew into the main attractions of the electoral periods, along-
side the usual events organized at the local level. They were the ultimate test of a 
candidate’s ”worth” as displayed in the confrontation with his political adversaries. 
In 2004, the broadcasted debate between Băsescu and Năstase registered the highest 
audience in the urban areas with 1.4 million people watching the first debate before 
the second round. The honesty of the D.A. candidate in admitting that the Romanian 
electorate was damned to choose between two politicians stained by a communist 
past was considered a key moment that gained him additional voters. The online 
campaigning was also taken to another level through websites for the candidates, 
email campaigns, blogs and video-sharing websites2.
The transformation of elections into clashes between candidates and personali-
ties rather then parties has increased the chances of leadership influence on voting, 
since each candidate is compelled to enrich the party agenda by adding issues and 
solutions specific to the district he intends to represent. As the candidates are suppo-
sed to know best the local problems, their personalization of the campaign platform 
1 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, ”Romania Presidential 
Election 22 November and 6 December 2009 – OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation 
Mission Final Report”, Warsaw, 17 February 2010, p. 12, available at www.osce.org/odihr/
elections/romania/41532. Last accessed on 23.05.2011.
2 For a detailed account of online campaign in the 2004 elections see Antonio MOMOC, 
”Online Negative Campaign in the 2004 Romanian Presidential Elections”, Styles of 
Communication, no. 2, 2010, pp. 89-99, available at http://journals.univ-danubius.ro/index.
php/communication/article/view/735. Last accessed on 27.05.2011.
325
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. XI • no. 2 • 2011
The Presidentialization of the Romanian Political System
and a higher stress on what they could do for the community, rather than what the 
party as such could do, is expected to increase the leadership effects on voting beha-
viour. The more and more direct contact with the ordinary citizen leads to vote based 
on trust in leaders rather than parties. As represented in Figure 2, the level of trust 
in political leaders, though not significantly high, managed to surpass the trust in 
parties as a whole in an interval of almost ten years1. At this point, a higher trust in 
leaders can be observed in the electoral period (1996, 2000 and 2004), while the gene-
ral trust in parties, when such data is analyzed goes down, which would sustain the 
assumption that people do start to vote more based on a evaluation of leadership.
Figure 1
The Trust in Political Parties and Leaders
Source: Gabriel BĂDESCU, Mircea COMŞA, Dumitru SANDU, Manuela STĂNCULESCU, 
”Barometrul de Opinie Publică 1998-2007”, cit., p. 92.
All things considered, the electoral presidentialization makes leaders dependent 
on their personal appeal and electoral success. However, this development indicates 
a higher individual responsibility, therefore the failure to abide by one’s promises 
could equate with an exit from the political scene. It is interesting to see how the par-
ties recuperate after losing their main electoral driving force. The socialists (PSD), for 
instance, are still in search of a new Iliescu. 
Conclusion
The application of the presidentialization test, as manifested in the Western coun-
tries, on an Eastern European state has generated a wealth of observations. The asses-
sment was organized along clear-cut analytical dimensions corresponding to the three 
arenas that indicate traits specific to the phenomenon under scrutiny. To this purpose, 
the attention was directed towards the executive face, the party face and the electo-
ral face. Each of these areas of interest was tackled in terms of leadership autonomy 
1 Gabriel BĂDESCU, Mircea COMŞA, Dumitru SANDU, Manuela STĂNCULESCU, 
”Barometrul de Opinie Publică 1998-2007”, October 2007, available at http://www.soros.ro/
ro/publicatii.php?cat=2#. Last accessed on 27.05.2011.
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and leadership-oriented resources, the role of the individual being regarded as extre-
mely influential in spite of structural, functional or cultural outlooks. With the sup-
port of statistical data derived from official releases and secondary sources, as well as 
the observations drawing on previous research, the present analysis established the 
boundaries of a new case of presidentializing system, Romania.
First of all, the constitutional arrangements most often determine Romania’s clas-
sification as a semi-presidential regime, which presents an inherent competition and 
conflict between the two parts of the executive, the president and the prime minister. 
Overall, a certain informal inclination towards escalating executive power is noticea-
ble at two levels: the government outpaces the Parliament in what concerns the legis-
lative process, whereas the president tends to outshine the prime minister in political 
assertiveness and influence. In the second case, a generalized propensity on the part 
of the presidents to accumulate prerogatives outside the constitutional framework 
is a work in progress. President Traian Băsescu has recurrently defined himself as 
an ”active player” that would alter the presidency according to the population’s 
aspirations. Various prime ministers, such as Adrian Năstase or Călin Popescu-Tări-
ceanu, have attempted to gain enhanced authority and escape the ”marionette” image 
frequently attached to their position, leading to a unique situation in Romanian post-
communist politics, the suspension of the president in 2007. 
Secondly, the political parties have been reconfigured as a result of ideological 
decline, disappearance of traditional cleavages and a changing environment molded 
by new disputes. The foremost consequence was the rise of personalized, catch-all, 
populist parties which have been extremely successful following the efforts of their 
charismatic leaders (e.g. PDSR, PDL, PRM). The impact of individual standpoints on 
appointments and policies has been crucial in developing patronage, clientelism and 
corruption. At the same time, the party leaders, conscious of their popularity and the 
dependence of the parties on their electoral value, have gained a particular autonomy 
in this area as well. To take a relevant example, the fingerprints of Băsescu’s ambitions 
have transformed the PD/PDL from a marginal promoter of social democracy into 
the main centre-right party in Romania, pushing it into a coalition (D.A.) that fabri-
cated a parliamentary majority and a government, despite a different winner of the 
parliamentary elections (PSD), and safeguarding a new PDL-UDMR government, in 
the same manner, as a result of the 2009 elections.
Finally, the electoral arena has indubitably excelled in favouring leaders instead 
of parties. The central role of the media is undeniable, whereas the progress of poli-
tical communication and marketing updated according to imported American tech-
niques has practically developed an obsession with adjusting the candidates’ images. 
This type of orientation is supported not only by the media and political consultants 
or experts, but also by the political parties which put their hopes into their leaders’ 
capacity to stylize the electoral platform as much as possible, and by the voters who, 
in accordance with their lack of time and means to develop an informed choice, tend 
to rely on particular evaluations of the candidates. The level of corruption, patronage 
and illegal behaviour specific to our country is most visible in electoral years, when 
the contest for votes reveals parties willing to do whatever to gain access to state insti-
tutions and resources, candidates who prefer discourses targeting a negative image of 
the opponent and a mass media whose political affiliations are in a constant change. 
To conclude, the Western presidentialization and the Romanian way of making 
politics seem to converge on several points. The interactions between structures and 
contingencies, between constitutional provisions, institutional designs and legacies 
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of the past, have not formally conducted to presidentialism, but to a gradual accu-
mulation of analogous features. At the beginning of the 1990s, the lack of democra-
tic knowledge, the less disciplined parties and the role of Ion Iliescu transformed 
the presidency into the ”micro-universe” around which the whole political spectrum 
revolved. Later on, Traian Băsescu has adopted the attitude of a president in a presi-
dential regime, but his achievements were still dependent on the support of his for-
mer party and the parliamentary majority. When a strong opposition against his will 
was constructed, the president had no choice but to resort to the ultimate sovereign: 
the people. Nevertheless, a three-folded political model would eventually encourage 
a clear presidentialization process in favour of the Romanian president: (a) the affi-
liation/membership of both the president and the prime minister in the same party, 
with the head of the government automatically assuming a subordinate position (e.g. 
the post-2008 configuration with Traian Băsescu as president and Emil Boc as prime 
minister); (b) the existence of a stable and coherent parliamentary majority controlled 
by the president; (c) an increasingly active president, that ”imposes” his agenda on 
the executive and finds his suggestions implemented. Even so, the weight of political 
contexts and personalities should not be overlooked. Would the withdrawal of these 
influential politicians equate with a return to ”normality”? Is this wave of presiden-
tialization a temporary consequence of a mixture between deficiencies specific to our 
democracy? Time and further research would settle these inquiries by providing the 
missing pieces of this puzzle.
